REVIEW

Madness and the CriminalLaw. NORVAL MORRIS. The University

of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1982. Pp. ix, 235. $20.00.
Statement on the Insanity Defense. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION (Dec. 1982).

Phillip E. Johnsont
Madness and the Criminal Law1 consists of two stories and

three essays. The stories-written as if the reminiscences of Eric
Blair (George Orwell) about his service in the 1920's as a police
magistrate in British-ruled Burma 2-are about crimes of passion,
and they illustrate some difficult issues of moral culpability and
social prejudice that the essays discuss in a more conventional
manner. Morris has a promising future as a writer of fiction: these
stories are both entertaining and thought-provoking. Both stories
suggest that outcomes of notorious criminal cases are governed

more by community prejudice or political pressure than by theories of culpability. The Brothel Boy was hanged for rape-murder
because both the British and the Burmese wanted him dead, although his mental capacity was minimal. The white Planter who
killed his native mistress in a trance was acquitted by a colonial
government which seemed to be more concerned with the interracial sexual scandal than the killing. Like Eric Blair himself, Norval
t
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2 Biographer Peter Lewis writes that Blair served

from 1922-27 as an assistant superintendent of police in Myaungmya, Upper Burma,
where he took charge of a district headquarters with between thirty and fifty men, and
later at five other stations including Moulmein in steamy Lower Burma. Between them,
these stations gave him the experiences on which he based not only his first and most
satisfactory novel, Burmese Days, but also the essays, A Hanging and Shooting an
Elephant, two of his most masterly pieces of physical description.
P. LEWIS, GEORGE ORWELL 40 (1981).
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Morris is unsentimental about human nature and the legal process.
The legal essays in the book also take a realistic, unsentimental posture towards the law of mental illness, although their

earnest rationalism contrasts oddly with the exotic cynicism of the
stories. Morris has stated his opinions in previous books and articles,8 and I detect no change in his position. He proposes that incapacity to stand trial should be no more than grounds for a continuance; if the doctors cannot restore capacity within a reasonable
time the criminal trial should proceed anyway with special safeguards for the defendant, because it is more rational to go ahead in
this way than to release the accused or to confine him indefinitely
for his incompetence. Morris would abolish the defense of legal insanity outright. Psychiatric testimony could still be received, like
evidence of intoxication, to the extent that it is relevant to determining mens rea. In addition, he suggests that there should be a
special "diminished responsibility" defense in homicide cases,
which would permit a jury to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter where mental illness is a factor.4 Otherwise, Morris
would have the law specify that mental illness is a relevant factor
in sentencing. The sentencing authority should take it into account
to reduce the sentence (because the mentally ill are supposedly
less culpable than other offenders) or to increase it in those instances where insanity is reliable evidence of dangerousness.'
The importance of Morris's argument lies not in its novelty,
but in its timeliness and in the authority of its author. President
Reagan's Department of Justice also wants to abolish the insanity
defense, 6 as did President Nixon's. 7 That kind of endorsement is

3 N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST PoLmcrAN's GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL (1970);

Burt & Morris, A Proposalfor the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. CHi. L. REv.
66 (1972); Morris, Psychiatry and the DangerousCriminal,41 S. CAL. L. REv. 514 (1968).
4 Morris advocates a diminished responsibility defense only as a "fall-back alternative
position," but he does seem to consider it a positively good idea. See MoRRis at 53-54, 69.
5

Hence the conclusion: the range of deserved punishment being otherwise determined,
the judge should sentence the mentally ill offender toward the bottom of that range
to the extent that his mental illness was causally related to his crime (or to his earlier
crimes), unless reliable evidence is adduced that because of his mental illness this
offender is substantially more likely than others in that range to be involved in similar or more serious crimes in the future.
Id. at 172 (emphasis in original). Because we do not have reliable techniques for predicting
behavior, Morris thinks that there will be "very few cases indeed" in which mental illness
may be used to increase the sentence. Id. at 171-72.
9 See Smith, Limiting the Insanity Defense: A Rational Approach to Irrational
Crimes, 47 Mo. L. REv. 605, 605 (1982) (based on testimony of United States Attorney
General William French Smith before the Senate Judiciary Committee concerning Reagan
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not likely to attract support from liberals in the legislatures, the
judiciary, or the psychiatric profession. Norval Morris, on the other
hand, is a man of the liberal center, a former law school dean, a
world-renowned scholar, and an influential pragmatic reformer. Intellectuals can hardly dismiss the abolitionist position out of hand
if it has the support of an expert of this calibre, and the courts are
less likely to find a constitutional requirement for an insanity defense if they believe that there is substantial academic support for
its abolition.
The timeliness of the book stems from the public reaction to
the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity in the Hinckley case
and, to a lesser extent, to the manslaughter conviction of San
Francisco Supervisor Dan White. John Hinckley is the young man
who attempted to assassinate President Reagan in order to attract
attention to himself and to impress a movie actress whom he admired from a distance. The subsequent proceedings called into
question not only the insanity defense but the rationality of our
adversarial jury-trial system. 8 After more than a year of expensive
pretrial maneuvering and psychiatric examinations, the lawyers
jousted for eight weeks of trial, examining and cross-examining expert witnesses who naturally gave conflicting and confusing testimony on whether Hinckley's obviously warped mentality
amounted to legal insanity. The judge instructed the jury to return
a verdict of not guilty unless they could agree "beyond a reasonable doubt" that Hinckley was sane.9 If taken literally, the instruction amounted to a directed verdict of not guilty, considering the
deadlock of expert opinion and the difficulty of certifying the sanity of a young man who shot the President to impress a movie star.
Juries usually ignore such unpopular legal standards, but the
Hinckley jury surprised everybody by taking the law seriously and
finding him not guilty. Hinckley will now be confined to a mental
hospital indefinitely because he is "dangerous," although there is
no reliable way to predict what he would do if released and no

administration proposals to abolish the insanity defense).
'AmERicN PSYCHITmc ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 6 (Dec.

1982).

3 See Taylor, Too Much Justice, HARPER'S, Sept. 1982, at 56. Taylor estimates the cost
of psychiatric and psychological expert testimony for this one trial at over $500,000. A single
prosecution expert received $122,742.91 in fees and expenses from the taxpayers.
9 At the time of the trial, federal law placed the burden of proof on the prosecution, but
District of Columbia law placed it on the defense. Hinckley was charged with both federal
and local crimes, but the trial judge decided to avoid confusion by instructing the jury only
on the federal rule.
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reliable test to determine if he has been "cured."
The California case of Dan White10 is nearly as notorious.
White impulsively resigned his elective office as San Francisco Supervisor, but then changed his mind and asked Mayor Moscone to
reappoint him to the vacancy. Moscone's decision to appoint another person so enraged White that he went to the City Hall with a
loaded pistol and shot the Mayor dead. After pausing to reload, he
crossed the hall and assassinated Supervisor Harvey Milk, a prominent leader of San Francisco's homosexual community and a political adversary of White.
The psychiatric defense was presented under California's "diminished capacity" doctrine, which in substance reduced the degree of a homicide from murder to manslaughter if the defendant
could not control his conduct or understand his duty to obey the
law.11 A prominent psychiatrist testified for the defense that the
violent outburst resulted from White's political and financial crisis
and from his habit of gorging himself on high-sugar "junk food"
when under stress. San Francisco juries tend to be eccentric, and a
number of factors may have contributed to the lenient manslaughter verdict,1" but press accounts gave the credit or blame to what
came to be called the "Twinkie Defense." The verdict sparked a
public backlash that united liberals and conservatives in opposition to a permissive psychiatric defense that was perceived as a
judicial license to kill. In a rare unanimous vote, the California
Legislature abolished the diminished capacity defense outright."
The Hinckley and White cases embarrassed the psychiatric
profession as well as the courts. The spectacle of highly-paid expert witnesses contradicting each other in court inevitably created
the impression that psychiatrists, like lawyers, are essentially paid
10

People v. White, 117 Cal. App. 3d 270, 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981). The facts and

background of the White case are given in Comment, The Diminished Capacity Defense in
California:An Idea Whose Time Has Gone?, 3 GLENDALE L. REv. 311, 314-18 (1979).
" See, e.g., People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 518 P.2d 342, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1974).
12 Some observers thought that the prosecutor made a weak effort, possibly
because of
law enforcement sympathy for White (an ex-policeman) and antipathy towards Harvey
Milk. Perhaps the verdict was not as lenient as the public supposed. The sentence White
initially received (7 2/3years, the maximum possible) was only four months less than that
handed out to Raskolnikov, the protagonist of Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment,for a
notorious double murder over a century ago; I had not previously thought of the Tsar's
courts as permissive. F. DOSTOYEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 519 (1950) (1st ed. n.p. 1866).
Of course, the differing climates of Siberia and California have to be considered, as well as
the food and other amenities. Due to statutory "good time" credits, White was recently
released after serving about 4 13 years.
" Act of Sept. 10, 1981, ch. 404, §§ 4, 5, 1981 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1200, 1201 (West) (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 28, 29 (West Supp. 1983)).
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advocates for the side that retains them. Psychiatrists like to point
out that economists and engineers also often disagree in litigation,
but such comparisons, however just, are really beside the point.
Granted that there are problems with other forms of expert testimony and granted that many difficulties are caused by incompetent lawyers, the adversary system, or the way we use juries, it remains true that there is good reason to be particularly dissatisfied
with the way we have been using psychiatric testimony in criminal
cases.
It is said that scholastic theologians debated over how many
angels can dance on the head of a pin. I suspect this story is a
canard invented by their enemies, but whatever these theologians
did was no sillier than asking a jury to decide beyond a reasonable
doubt whether a defendant who committed a purposeful act for
some bizarre motive could have acted otherwise if he had wished to
do so. 14 Of course, psychiatrists give conflicting testimony about a
question like that. Free will is a philosophical premise, not an observable medical datum. We might as well ask for expert opinion
about why there is something instead of nothing.
Unfavorable publicity generated by recent notorious trials is
not the only reason that there is widespread interest in reexamining the insanity defense. It has long been assumed that the insanity defense was relatively harmless because it was invoked
mainly as a way of avoiding the death penalty. 15 An insanity acquittal supposedly led to very lengthy confinement in a secure
mental institution, and therefore the public did not need to be
concerned that the defendant was "getting away with" anything.
Leading opinions have even suggested that successful insanity defenses further public safety by ensuring that mentally ill offenders
remain confined until "cured" of their dangerous propensities.1 "
Whatever may have been the case in the past, such statements are
not realistic today. There has been a massive change in public policy towards the mentally ill, and large-scale institutional confine-

"4The

prevailing tests of legal insanity are variations of the American Law Institute's

MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962), which provides that "[a] person is not responsible for

criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."
15 See Stone, The Insanity Defense on Trial, HARv. L. SCH. BULL., Fall 1982, 15, 18-20
for a review of changing attitudes about the effect of an insanity acquittal.
16 See, e.g., Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 66-67 (9th Cir. 1970), quoted with
approval in People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 341, 583 P.2d 1318, 1322, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 279
(1978).

1983]

Review

1539

ment is no longer orthodox. Drug therapy enables many psychotics
and disturbed persons to function effectively in the community
17
and, effective or not, in the community is where they are.
With deinstitutionalization has come an increased awareness
among both psychiatrists and lawyers of how limited our ability to
predict future conduct really is, as well as much more modest expectations about what we can expect in the way of cure. These developments have enormous importance for the insanity defense because long-term confinement of insanity acquittees can no longer
be taken for granted.
One who is as notorious as John Hinckley is held in custody to
forestall public outrage, but it would not be easy to prove that he
is really more likely to shoot anyone in the future than hundreds of
other disturbed persons who have been released or that he is likely
to benefit from further institutional treatment. That he may continue to harass the actress Jodie Foster or some substitute ideal
figure is another matter, but we do not as a rule confine people to
protect celebrities from unwanted attentions. It is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that the primary reason Hinckley remains in custody is that most people think he is guilty of attempted murder
regardless of the jury verdict. There must be a better solution to
the insanity problem than this.
Norval Morris's solution, as we have seen, involves abolishing
the insanity defense as such but permitting psychiatric testimony
to be used to show lack of mens rea, to reduce the sentence of a
defendant convicted of any crime, and to reduce murder to manslaughter where mental illness diminishes responsibility. Morris
has a great deal to say on behalf of his proposals, and I sympathize
with his objectives, but somehow I find it difficult to believe that
such a reshuffling of the legal categories will work any lasting good.
As the White case illustrates, psychiatric defenses are every bit as
difficult to limit, and every bit as likely to produce bizarre results,
when they are litigated as "diminished capacity" rather than as
"legal insanity." No matter what legal pigeonhole we select, a criminal trial is still an unsatisfactory forum for evaluating competing
theories of the mind.
I am baffled by the logic behind the idea that manslaughter is
the proper legal category for psychotic killers. The case Morris has
17 See Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization,Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 440 (1982). ("Unfortunately, in many areas of the
country the humanitarian purpose of deinstitutionalization has been perverted, and the policy has resulted in the abandonment of the mentally ill to their fates on city streets.").
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in mind for such treatment is the paranoiac who kills some prominent person because he believes God has ordered him to do so.
This type of psychotic can intend or even premeditate a killing if
these words are given their ordinary meaning, but Morris thinks
that "such cases are . . . better treated and sentenced as manslaughter than as murder." ' No doubt many assassins act from
motives which they regard as good, but why should that be an excuse? Manslaughter is a category appropriate to homicides that
arise from barroom brawls or lovers' quarrels, where the victim has
some responsibility for what happened. Manslaughterers are frequently eligible for probation, and they ordinarily do not receive
lengthy prison terms. Should the paranoid who shoots a politician
be placed on probation, or be sentenced to two or three years in
prison? I would say that either a verdict of guilty of murder or one
of not guilty by reason of insanity would make more sense than
treating a homicidal maniac as if he were a normal person who has
used too much force in a fair fight.
The proposal to consider evidence of mental disturbance in
sentencing seems harmless enough if one assumes that no change
in existing sentencing practice is contemplated. Judges now receive
all sorts of information about defendants, and they generally sentence according to "seat of the pants" criteria that defy logical explanation. Mandatory minimum sentences for serious cases prevent the kind of excessive leniency that public opinion will not
tolerate. A political assassin does not receive probation, for example, even if he is a first offender, even if the act was related to
some psychological disturbance, and even if he seems unlikely to
kill again. But Norval Morris opposes mandatory minimum
sentences, even for murder.1 9 Most judges can no doubt be trusted
to punish murder at a level consistent with prevailing community
standards, but then most juries can be trusted to disregard psychiatric defenses in cases like Hinckley and White. There are exceptions. I can imagine a judge who takes both psychiatric testimony
and due process ideology very seriously-and several names come
to mind-placing a psychotic offender on probation regardless of
the offense. If mental illness caused the crime, if we lack reliable
techniques for predicting further violent acts, and if the legislature
has not seen fit to preclude probation, why not?
Unlike some other critics of the insanity defense, Morris is no
debunker of psychiatry or psychology as such, nor does he seem at
18 MORRIS

29 Id.

at 69.
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all uncomfortable with the "soft" determinism that underlies the
"substantial capacity" test of the Model Penal Code. He considers
"mental illness" an objective condition, not merely a metaphor or
an arbitrary label, and assumes that psychiatrists can give reliable
testimony about how much capacity a defendant had to control his
or her criminal behavior. What Morris objects to is not that the
criminal process gives substantial weight to testimony about difficult concepts like mental illness, degrees of free will and the like,
but only that it does so in the either-or, guilty or not guilty categories of the insanity defense. 20 Presumably he would permit the psychiatrists in the Hinckley case, for example, to testify precisely as
they did at that trial provided that they did so to support a reduced sentence rather than an insanity defense.
But if psychiatric testimony can establish a substantial diminution of culpability in many cases, why can it not show a complete, or virtually complete, lack of culpability in others? It may be
that our current insanity defense is too broad, especially in placing
an unreasonable burden of proof on the prosecution, but to say
this is in no way to deny that there is a residual category of persons whose mental disorientation is so severe that they are incapable of culpability.
Morris appears to concede the logic of this argument,21 but
then attempts to answer it with a reductio ad absurdum. If we
were to eliminate "responsibility in those situations where we
thought there had been a substantial impairment of the capacity to
choose between crime and no crime" then "as a matter of moral
fairness" we should also allow a defense of "gross social adversity."'22 This is said to follow because criminal behavior is less

closely correlated with psychosis than with "being born to a oneparent family living on welfare in a black inner-city area.

'2 3

But

this comparison is beside the point. We do not excuse psychotics
because psychosis is highly correlated with crime, but because they
are thought to lack the ability to make morally responsible choices.
Six-year-old children hardly ever commit homicide, but when they
do they are excused. The most severely disabled psychotics are
probably less likely to commit criminal acts than those who are
more nearly normal and hence more capable of effective action.
The point is not that insanity causes crime, but rather that it prevents morally responsible choice.

20

Id. at 62.

" Id.

"Id.
3 Id. at 63.
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Morris goes astray on this issue because he refuses to distinguish between the argument for having some insanity defense and
the much less persuasive argument for having the kind of broad
insanity defense with which we are currently saddled. A system of
law based on a premise of moral responsibility needs to draw a line
between those who are responsible and those who are not. It is
awkward to do this through the definition of "criminal intent," not
only because there are crimes that do not require intent, but also
because intent has a qualitative dimension. For example, we commonly distinguish between a child who spills his milk accidentally
and one who "intentionally" pours it on his baby sister. In fact, we
punish small children for much the same reasons that we punish
criminals, and children frequently know they have done wrong and
show remorse. I am not denying that there are enormous differences between children and adults, but these differences are not
well captured by the ordinary-language meaning of "intent."
No one argues that small children have sufficient moral understanding to have criminal responsibility. Whether and to what extent psychotics should be held responsible is more controversial,
but I judge that most people would consider that at least some
extremely disoriented persons, in addition to the severely mentally
retarded, are no more responsible than children. Wherever one
thinks the line ought to be drawn, it is a poor solution to ask a jury
to determine the defendant's capacity for responsibility by hearing
expert testimony on whether a psychotic "intends" his actions. Inevitably the psychiatrists will want to explain the quality of the
defendant's intention, just as they like to talk about the quality of
his understanding of the wrongfulness of his act when testifying
under the M'Naghten rule. On the basis of the California experience, I am convinced that psychiatric testimony is even more confusing and more difficult to control when it comes in on the question of intent or mens rea than when it is limited to an insanity
defense.24
24 Dr. Bernard Diamond achieved a famous coup for courtroom psychiatry when he
persuaded the California courts to allow him to testify about the "medical essence" of malice aforethought. People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 723, 336 P.2d 492, 496 (1959). Dr. Diamond himself described this wording as a "sophistry" that was necessary to establish a

sound principle. Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill, 14 STAN. L. REv. 59,

82-83 (1961). Morris regards the California doctrine that Diamond fathered as unacceptably
complex and confusing, MORRIs at 66-67, but he endorses the Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6
Eliz. 2, ch. 11, which reduces murder to manslaughter where the accused "was suffering
from such abnormality of mind . . .as substantially impaired his mental responsibility
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Morris makes a curious argument in support of admitting psychiatric evidence on the question of mens rea:
It is unthinkable that mental illness should be given a lesser
reach than drunkenness. If a given mental condition (intent,
recklessness) is required for the conviction of a criminal offense, then, as a proposition requiring no discussion, in the
absence of that mental condition there can be no conviction.
This holds true whether the absence of that condition is attributable to blindness, deafness, drunkenness, mental illness
or retardation, linguistic 5difficulties, or, if it could be estab2
lished, hypnotic control.
But it is not at all "unthinkable" that on some issues the law
might be more receptive to evidence of drunkenness than to testimony about mental illness. Alcoholic intoxication is a relatively
common condition which jurors can understand from personal experience and observation, whereas mental illness is a considerably
more elusive phenomenon. In any case, the admissibility of drunkenness to show lack of culpability is itself a complex subject, as
every law student learns. Even the Model Penal Code refuses to
allow a defendant to show that he was unaware of a risk because of
intoxication,2 6 and some jurisdictions have much more restrictive
rules.27 These rules reflect a belief that evidence of intoxication,
although logically relevant where intent 'or awareness of risk is an
issue, has a tendency to confuse and mislead a jury. If psychiatric
testimony about intent is at least as likely to confuse, or to lead to
an unproductive battle of the experts, then a special exclusion may
be justified.2 8

.... " MoRms at 66-69. The English statute has the relative merit of accomplishing clearly

and directly what the judge-made California doctrine accomplished with tortuous sophistries, but the substance is the same. See supra text accompanying note 11.
:5 MORRIS at 60.
6MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (1962) provides that "[w]hen recklessness establishes an
element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of
which he would have been aware had he been sober, such awareness is immaterial."
17 See, e.g., State v. Stasio, 78 N.J. 467, 489, 396 A.2d 1129, 1140 (1979). Many judges
and commentators have pointed out that intoxication logically would be a defense only in
the rare case where it is so extreme as to negate intent, not where it merely relaxes inhibitions. But this is a difficult distinction for judges and juries to maintain, and the issue produces much wasteful litigation.
2SMorris has written me that he did not intend in the quoted paragraph to imply that
drunkenness is always admissible on the mens rea question, or that it should be. "My point
was a very small one-if, for example, drunkenness is admissible on recklessness in minois
(as contrasted to M.P.C.) then mental illness also ought to be." Letter from Norval Morris
to the author (March 31, 1983) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). This
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Morris's approach to the insanity problem is squarely in the
"neutral principles" tradition of liberal legal scholarship. He considers substantive disagreements about the nature of mental illness
or the morality of criminal punishment to be of little importance:
all can be well if we just agree on the legal doctrines. He begins the
first page by announcing that he means to include in his argument
"all reasonable perceptions of mental illness" from Thomas Szasz
to Karl Menninger. His subject is how mental illness or retardation
"no matter how defined" relates to the criminal law. Morris later
writes that "[ilt is the overreaching theme of this book that injustice and inefficiency invariably flow from any blending of the criminal law and mental health powers of the state." 9
Such an approach is coherent only if one believes that people
as far apart ideologically as Thomas Szasz and Karl Menninger
nonetheless agree on the meaning of "justice" and on the desirability of having an "efficient" criminal process. But of course they do
not. Menninger considered all punishment to be obsolete and
vengeful, and he thought that justice means nothing more than
power, "the interest of the stronger." 0 Szasz, on the other hand, is
famous for arguing that mental illness is a metaphor (and a fraudulent one at that), and he has repeatedly anathematized Menninger and his kind as preachers of an arrogant and totalitarian
religion.3 1 A Menninger who sees criminal law as institutionalized
brutality will not be interested in making brutality efficient, and a
Szasz who sees psychiatry as a fraud will not be satisfied if its
fraudulent concepts are accepted for the purpose of determining
punishment. Doctrines of criminal responsibility are troubled and
uncertain because they reflect this ideological battle, and the substantive dispute has to be settled before a procedural solution is
possible.
The substantive dispute may be nearer to a settlement than
most people imagine. In December, 1982, approximately one
month after the publication of Madness and the Criminal Law,
the American Psychiatric Association (APA) issued an official
Statement on the Insanity Defense.3 2 The Statement was pre-

leaves his overall position hanging in the air: mental illness ought to be treated like drunkenness, however that might be.
2 MoRRs at 1, 2, 31. I do not understand what Morris means by this opposition to
"blending." His own proposals to consider mental illness on the mens rea and sentencing
issues seem to involve a blending of mental health law and criminal law.
30 K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 11, 280 (1968).
31 T. SZASZ, IDEOLOGY AND INSANITY 8-9, 220-21 (1970).
2AMiE~cAN

PsYcnwTric

AssoCITION, STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE

(Dec.
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pared by a committee of distinguished psychiatrists with the counsel of Dr. Alan Stone, Professor of Law and Psychiatry at Harvard.
The Foreword by the current APA President, Dr. H. Keith H. Brodie, Chancellor of Duke University, describes the Statement as reflecting "the current thought and opinion of the vast majority of
psychiatrists who are informed and concerned about the insanity
defense issue."33 Clearly the APA Statement supersedes all previous sources as the essential expression of the psychiatric viewpoint
on the insanity defense. It is a remarkable document, and it ought
to change the way lawyers think about psychiatry.
After introductory sections about the history of the insanity
defense and the public uproar over the Hinckley case, which the
APA describes as the catalyst for its preparation of a position paper,3 the Statement proceeds to answer six important questions:
1. Should the insanity defense be abolished? No, says the
APA, because the defense "rests upon one of the fundamental
premises of the criminal law, that punishment for wrongful deeds
should be predicated upon moral culpability." This premise logically requires an exclusion for defendants "who lack the ability
(the capacity) to rationally control their behavior" and who therefore "cannot be said to have 'chosen to do wrong.'" "Retention of
the insanity defense is essential to the moral integrity of the criminal law."3 5 As we have seen, this is a commonly held position, and
it has considerable force if it is limited to justifying the existence
of some insanity defense, possibly a very narrow one.
2. Should a guilty but mentally ill verdict be adopted in the
law to either supplement or take the place of the traditional insanity defense? The APA opposes the alternative guilty but mentally ill (GBI) verdict, now in use in nine states, becauise it tempts
jurors to "avoid grappling with the difficult moral issues inherent
in adjudicating guilt or innocence" and instead to agree on the
convenient GBI label, which in practical effect means the same
thing as "guilty. 3 6

1982) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as APA STATEMENT].
33 Id. at i. The Statement does not expressly refer to any dissenting opinions, but of
course there are psychiatrists and psychologists who would take a different view. I am informed that the American Psychological Association decided not to address the legal insanity question at this time, partly because of the greater difficulty of obtaining agreement
among its larger membership, and partly because psychologists are less closely identified
with the issue.
S Id. at 8.
Id. at 9, 10.
36 Id. at 11, 12.
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3. Should the legal standards now in use concerning the insanity defense be modified? Although the APA doubts that the exact wording of the test for legal insanity is of crucial importance, it
observes that
[m]any psychiatrists . . . believe that psychiatric information relevant to determining whether a defendant understood the nature of his act, and whether he appreciated its
wrongfulness, is more reliable and has a stronger scientific basis than, for example, does psychiatric information relevant
to
37
whether a defendant was able to control his behavior.
Because "[tihe concept of volition is the subject of some disagreement among psychiatrists," testimony on that subject is likely to
confuse a jury.3 8
In other words, the psychiatrists have now decided that they
prefer to testify under the classic M'Naghten standard, with its
solely cognitive elements, rather than under the ALI test with its
more "modern," volitional approach. This directly contradicts conventional judicial notions of what psychiatrists think." The APA
also proposes a narrow definition of "mental disorder" to rule out
insanity acquittals of persons with mere "personality disorders"
that do not involve the severe disorientation from reality characteristic of psychoses. 40 In short, official psychiatric opinion now regards the reform and expansion of the insanity defense that has
occurred in the past thirty years as fundamentally misguided, although that reform was largely motivated by a desire to accommodate psychiatry.
4. Should the burden of proof in insanity cases always rest
with the prosecution?All the federal courts and a number of states
currently require the prosecution to prove sanity "beyond a reasonable doubt." The APA declines to take a position on which side
should have the burden of proof, but it does note that "psychiatric
evidence is usually not sufficiently clear-cut to prove or disprove
[the presence of mental illness and dangerousness] 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' -41 citing Addington v. Texas.42 1 assume it follows
37Id.

at 14.
:8 Id.
' As recently as 1979, the California Supreme Court replaced the M'Naghten formula
with the ALI test, largely because the latter was seen as far more consonant with modern
psychiatric opinion. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 336, 583 P.2d 1318, 1318-19, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 275, 275-76 (1978).
40 APA STATEMENT at 15.
41 Id. at 16, 17.
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that neither side should be required to meet an impossible standard of proof.
5. Should psychiatric testimony be limited to statements of
mental condition? The APA "is not opposed to" evidentiary rules
that restrict psychiatrists from testifying to the "ultimate legal issues" of the insanity defense. The APA's motive is to minimize the
kind of "battle of the experts" that has done so much to discredit
courtroom psychiatry. The Statement notes that in many trials
"both prosecution and defense psychiatrists do agree about the nature and even the extent of mental disorder exhibited by the defendant"; what they disagree about is "the probable relationship
between medical concepts and legal or moral constructs such as
free will."' 3 The goal is to have psychiatrists testify about the former, about which they have expert knowledge and tend to agree,
and not about the latter."
6. What should be done with defendants following not guilty
by reason of insanity verdicts? The APA argues that it is a mistake
to treat persons acquitted of violent crimes for insanity as if they
were equivalent to mentally ill persons who have not attacked anyone. Those in the former group should be released only if adequate
resources are available to provide supervision. If they are confined
beyond a reasonable treatment period for public safety reasons, as
may frequently be the case, society should acknowledge what it is
doing and keep them in a "nontreatment facility that can provide
the necessary security," in other words, in a prison. The decision to
release would be made "by a group similar in composition to a parole board," a group that is "not naive about the nature of violent
behavior committed by mental patients and that allows a quasi45
criminal approach for managing such persons.'
The specific positions of the APA Statement are important,
"441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
43 APA STATEMENT at 17-19 (emphasis in original).
4 I am skeptical about the enforceability of evidentiary rules that prevent experts from
testifying about the "ultimate issue." A.better way of dealing with the problem is to redefine
the insanity test to incorporate a "justice" element which is plainly beyond psychiatric jurisdiction. Such a test might provide for acquittal when the defendant "was so utterly lacking
the ability to understand the wrongfulness of his act that it would be unjust to punish him."
See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
4" APA STATEMENT at 19-23. The APA Statement specially endorses the Oregon procedure, whereby a "Psychiatric Security Review Board . . . retains control of the insanity
acquittee for a period of time as long as the criminal sentence that might have been
awarded were the person to have been found guilty of the act." Id. This sounds a lot like the
"guilty but insane" verdict that the APA opposes, but strict logical consistency is not the
virtue we need most in this area.
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but more significant is the change of attitude that it indicates.4
The APA has not adopted the extreme views of Thomas Szasz, but
it has definitely repudiated the ideology of Karl Menninger. The
psychiatrists no longer want the criminal law to change to conform
to deterministic psychiatric concepts; instead, they regard it as vital to the integrity of their own discipline that "legal or moral constructs such as free will" be understood as outside the domain of
psychiatry. They emphatically affirm that most people, including
those with sociopathic personality disorders, should be held accountable for what they do. They are not washing their hands of
the legal problems, and they believe that the law still needs them,
but they understand that legal and moral decisions are ultimately
to be made by citizens, not experts. I regard this newly found modesty as evidence of the profession's increasing maturity, not as a
sign of its failure.
The important thing to know about the law of mental illness is
not what Norval Morris thinks about it or what I think about it,
but what the important interest groups that lobby the legislatures
and the courts think about it. Until recently, liberal intellectuals
generally and mental health professionals in particular formed a
national constituency to support open-ended psychiatric defenses.
That constituency no longer exists, at least not in as solid a form.
The most substantial cause of the change has been the deinstitutionalization movement, which has been supported by civil liberties lawyers, numerous psychiatrists and psychologists, and
budget-cutting politicians. The ideological side of this movement
has attacked the meaning and validity of psychiatric diagnoses
which have been used to support civil commitments, and these attacks have also tended to undermine trust in psychiatric testimony
in criminal cases. Moreover, the public will tolerate insanity acquittals only if it is convinced that "dangerous" defendants are
locked away through a commitment procedure. An insanity defense broad enough to protect our all-too-numerous irrationally
motivated political assassins, for example, inevitably encourages
legislators to think in terms of a broad commitment process, espe46 Indeed, the APA Statement may modify the law by its very existence. Prosecutors
can cite the Statement in challenging the admissibility of psychiatric testimony that goes to

the issue of "free will" or "capacity to control" conduct. If the organization best qualified to
speak for the psychiatric profession considers free will to be a legal and moral concept

whose existence cannot be proven by psychiatric methods, then no individual psychiatrist
should be permitted to mislead a jury by offering "expert" testimony on the subject. Where

a witness does so testify, the Statement should provide material for effective crossexamination.
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cially if they fear that equality-minded courts will insist that insanity acquittees be treated just like other "innocent" people.
The resulting political realignment is illustrated by the debate
at the February, 1983, American Bar Association Convention,
where the House of Delegates endorsed a modern wording of the
traditional M'Naghten rule with its purely cognitive focus to replace the broader ALI test with its "volitional" component.4
Among those speaking for the change were Dr. Loren Roth, representing the American Psychiatric Association, and Bruce Ennis,
Chairman of the ABA Commission on the Mentally Disabled. Ennis is the former American Civil Liberties Union litigator who has
been a leading figure in the movement to protect the liberties of
the mentally ill. It seems that there is important support for narrowing the insanity defense from knowledgeable persons who are
not usually found in the law-enforcement camp.
Experience has shown that the criminal law, despite all its
faults, is preferable to any civil commitment alternative as a means
for dealing with unacceptable behavior. Exemptions from criminal
responsibility therefore ought to be narrowly confined, and regardless of mental illness we should be careful to distinguish between
people who have actually committed violent crimes and those who
are merely thought likely to commit them. One way of helping to
maintain this distinction is to narrow the insanity defense to the
point where it applies only to people who are so mentally disabled
that they are incapable of taking care of themselves in society.
Such people have to be closely supervised for their own protection
in any case. To the extent that we now regard other mentally ill
persons as having a right to remain at liberty without supervision,
it is not unreasonable to hold them morally responsible for what
they do with that liberty.
The result would be an insanity defense that preserves the
moral theory of the law, but that would rarely arise in a criminal
trial. A pointless controversy could be put behind us, and we could
go on to address the real problems that ought to concern us: control of sentencing discretion, improving conditions in prisons, and
finding rehabilitative programs that work. Among law professors,
no one has done more to address these problems than Norval
Morris.

4' The
1983).
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